This contribution is not aimed at discussing any alternate public or economic policy interests behind action in Libya. Instead, it follows the mainstream discussion on Libya as an implementation of the 'responsibility to protect' arguendo, in order to refl ect upon consequences of implementing such a concept.
means opening the metaphorical 'Jar of Pandora' 2 by releasing a whole new number of unintended consequences?
The fi rst of these concerns is the situation in Libya itself after the revolution. Clashes continued even after the overthrow of Gaddafi 's regime. The country is still haunted by tribal and religious tensions as the new authorities are struggling to establish and maintain a minimum level of law and order. The promise of a brighter future for Libya seems distant now.
Beyond this distant future lie the signifi cant cross-border effects of regime change in Libya. The fi rst one is the situation in Mali, where France deployed troops in early 2013, in order to help the government repel rebel Islamist groups that plague the north of the country. The second is the impact of Libya on the full-blown civil war that is being waged in Syria, where the international community gives the impression of alternating between the role of the idle bystander and arming for intervention.
It is not the purpose of this contribution to join the discourse on the possible legal implications or normative value of the 'responsibility to protect'. It should suffi ce to acknowledge that the concept arose as a consequence of the humanitarian intervention discourse following NATO action in Kosovo in 1999 3 and that it has since been endorsed in a more or less watered down variation in points 138 and 139 of the prominent 'World Summit Outcome'
